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Abstract
The argument from naturalness is widely employed in contemporary quan-
tum field theory. Essentially a formalized aesthetic criterion, it received a
meaning in the debate on the Higgs mechanism, which goes beyond aes-
thetics. We follow the history of technical definitions of fine tuning at the
scale of electroweak symmetry breaking. It is argued that they give rise to
a special interpretation of probability, which we call Gedankenfrequency.
By extension of its original meaning, the argument from naturalness is
used to compare different models beyond the Standard Model. We show
that in this case naturalness cannot be defined objectively. Rather, it func-
tions as socio-historical heuristics in particle physics and it contributes to
the advent of a probabilistic version of Popper’s falsificationism.
1 Introduction
Arguments from naturalness play an important role in particle physics of the
last 25 years. Gerard ’t Hooft was the first to introduce naturalness in this
physical discipline, connecting it with symmetry:
The naturalness criterion states that one such [dimensionless and
measured in units of the cut-off] parameter is allowed to be much
smaller than unity only if setting it to zero increases the symmetry
of the theory. If this does not happen, the theory is unnatural. [59]
Emphasized in this definition, the connection of naturalness with symmetry
could have provided a philosophical background for the former based on the
conceptual importance of the latter. Concerning symmetry, since Plato and the
17th-century French debate between Claude Perrault and Franc¸ois Blondel, two
opposing views have taken it to be, respectively, an expression of the aesthetic
imperative of beauty and a human-invented instrument for better executing the
job of the engineer. In turn, naturalness has both a connection with beauty and
a heuristic, road-mapping role in science. Based upon ’t Hooft’s definition, it
could have received a double conceptual foundation similar to that of symmetry.
But history has chosen a more intriguing path. The original ’t Hooft’s idea faded
away behind the many facets of the actual use of naturalness in particle physics.
Since the 1970s, the notion of naturalness has been gradually evolving away
from the connection with symmetry. In what physicists say about its meaning
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one finds rare heuristic arguments as well as abundant references to beauty:
naturalness is an “aesthetic criterion” [5], a “question of aesthetics” [30], an
“aesthetic choice” [7]. Sometimes the aesthetical significance of naturalness
and the heuristic role are mixed together: “the sense of ‘aesthetic beauty’ is a
powerful guiding principle for physicists” [36].
One must not belittle the place of beauty in the scientist’s thinking. An intu-
itive aesthetic sense can be developed by the practice of mathematical reasoning
and it can then serve as a thinking aid. In mathematics, once beauty and ele-
gance have shown the way to new discoveries, all the results must be rigorously
established through proof. In natural science, “rational beauty” [50] can only
be admired at the end of inquiry, when we have established a sound scientific
account in agreement with nature. Einstein vividly supported this view early in
his life, saying that aesthetically motivated arguments “may be valuable when
an already found [his emphasis] truth needs to be formulated in a final form,
but fail almost always as heuristic aids” [32]. Used as a guide for discovering
reality, aesthetic arguments may indeed turn out to be extraordinarily fruitful
as well as completely misleading, and so for two reasons.
First, because the real universe is not just beautiful: one can also discern
in it futility [61] or inefficiency [31]. Nature is not what the American physicist
Karl Darrow thought she was, when he stated that it would be more “elegant”
if there were only two particles in the atomic nucleus [26]. Perhaps the most
outspoken promoter of mathematical beauty in physics, Dirac has many times
been led by it into scientifically sterile byways [41, chapter 14]. Thus beauty
is not an exclusive characteristic of the results of science and should not be
elevated to a research imperative.
Second, because there is no necessary link between beauty and empirically
verified truth. The two notions are disconnected: the beautiful may be false, and
the true may be ugly. In spite of a long debate on this topic between eminent
physicists (e.g., see [22]), we maintain that beauty and truth, as well as beauty
and good, are distinct categories, in physics in particular. Aesthetic arguments
are a methodologically problematic and a potentially misleading lighthouse on
the road to sound science in the physical universe.
In Section 2, we review physics of the Higgs mechanism and remind that
the argument from naturalness often gives the impression of being a perfectly
normal scientific argument. Section 3 describes the many lines of development of
the concept of naturalness in particle physics. Among all fine-tuning arguments,
the valid one is neither anthropic (Section 4) nor an argument from beauty. We
argue in Section 5 that it involves a special interpretation of probability and is
meaningful only if naturalness in particle physics is understood as heuristics.
Practicality of being guided by the considerations of fine tuning then stems not
as much from aesthetics as from the down-to-earth sociological factors, which
determine the physical theory’s way of development. Naturalness can be best
warranted with the help of historical analysis.
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2 The Higgs mechanism
The observed weak interaction is not locally gauge invariant and its unification
with electromagnetism must take it into account. To this end, a mechanism
must be introduced within any unified theory of electroweak (EW) interactions
to put the two interactions back on unequal grounds. By offering one such
mechanism the Standard Model (SM) describes electroweak symmetry breaking
quantitatively. Invented in 1964 independently by several different groups, this
so-called Higgs mechanism builds on the fact that a massless spin-one particle
has two polarization states and a massive one has three. Electroweak symmetry
breaking produces a would-be Goldstone boson, whose physical degree of free-
dom is absorbed by the massless gauge boson. Number of polarization states of
the latter then increases from two to three and it becomes massive. Such mas-
sive gauge bosons account for the absence of gauge symmetry in the observed
weak interaction.
This description was quickly recognized to be not very compelling due to
its lack of explanatory power [36, 53]. Many physicists did not find impor-
tant the conceptual problems of the Higgs mechanism simply because they took
it for no more than a convenient, but temporary, solution of the problem of
electroweak symmetry breaking. Jean Iliopoulos said at the 1979 Einstein Sym-
posium: “Several people believe, and I share this view, that the Higgs scheme is
a convenient parametrization of our ignorance concerning the dynamics of spon-
taneous symmetry breaking, and elementary scalar particles do not exist” [40].
But, with time, things have changed. Discovery of W and Z bosons and a
growing amount of electroweak precision data confirmed the ideas of Weinberg
and Salam. Not only is there today confidence in the Standard Model, but it is
clear that changing it ought to be exceptionally difficult, due to an exceedingly
large number of tests with which any model beyond the Standard Model (BSM)
must conform. By 2004, Ed Wilson was completely assured: “A claim that
scalar elementary particles were unlikely to occur in elementary particle physics
at currently measurable energies . . .makes no sense” [64].
The SM Higgs mechanism is a pleasingly economical solution for breaking the
electroweak symmetry. However, the global fit of the electroweak precision data
is consistent with the Standard Model only in case one takes an average over
all available experimental data: then arises the usual prediction of a relatively
light Higgs mH < 182 GeV [39]. Troubles occur, when one looks at the details
of the data: different ways of calculating the Higgs mass mH , based on distinct
experimental measurements, lead to incompatible predictions. Overlap between
EW precision tests is less than 2% (Figure 1).
For example, the value of the top quark mass extracted from EW data
(excluding direct Tevatron measurements) is mt = 178.9
+11.7
−8.6 GeV, while the
CDF/D0 result is mt = 172.6±0.8(stat)±1.1(syst) GeV [35]. This discrepancy
worsens considerably the SM fit. Of more direct impact on the light Higgs hy-
pothesis is the observation that two most precise measurements of the Weinberg
angle sin2 θW do not agree very well, differing by more than 3σ. The bb¯ forward-
backward asymmetry A0,lfb measured at LEP gives a large value of sin
2 θW , which
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Figure 1: Values of the Higgs mass extracted from different EW observables.
The vertical line is the direct LEP lower limit of 114 GeV. The average is shown
as a green band [39].
leads to the prediction of a relatively heavy Higgs with mH = 420
+420
−190 GeV.
On the other hand, the lepton left-right asymmetry Al measured at SLD (in
agreement with the leptonic asymmetries measured at LEP) gives a low value
of sin2 θW , corresponding to mH = 31
+33
−19 GeV, in conflict with the lower limit
mH > 114 GeV from direct LEP searches [9]. Moreover, the world average of
the W mass, mW = 80.392±0.029 GeV, is larger than the value extracted from
a SM fit, again requiring mH to be smaller than what is allowed by the LEP
Higgs searches [37].
For a physicist, inconsistency between the predictions of the Higgs mass
means that the argument in favor of the SM with a light Higgs is “less com-
pelling” [37]. What message exactly is encoded in the 2% overlap? Does this
number correspond to some probability? In what sense does the smallness of
this value make the SM Higgs less compelling?
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3 Measures of naturalness
3.1 Hierarchy problems
The Standard Model suffers from a ‘big’ hierarchy problem: in the Lagrangian,
the Higgs mass parameter m2H , which is related to the physical mass by m
2
h =
−2m2H , is affected by incalculable cut-off dependent quantum corrections. Which-
ever new theory, possibly including gravitation, replaces the Standard Model
above some energy scale ΛNP, one can expect the Higgs mass parameter to
be of the same size as (or bigger than) the SM contribution computed with a
cut-off scale ΛNP. This way of estimating the size of the Higgs mass is made
reasonable by the analogy with the electromagnetic contribution to m2
pi+
−m2
pi0
.
The leading quantum correction is then expected to come from the top quark
sector and is estimated to be [53]
δm2H ∼ −
3λ2t
8π2
Λ2NP . (1)
This contribution is compatible with the allowed range of m2h only if the
cut-off is rather low
ΛNP < 600× ( mh
200GeV
)GeV . (2)
Now, if the energy range of the SM validity is as low as 500 GeV – 1 TeV, why
did previous experiments not detect any deviation from the SM predictions?
Even though the center of mass energy of these experiments was significantly
lower than 1 TeV, still their precision was high enough to make them sensitive
to virtual effects associated with a much higher scale.
To state it in other terms, note that effects from new physics at a scale ΛNP
can in general be parametrized by adding to the SM renormalizable Lagrangian
a tower of higher dimensional local operators, with coefficients suppressed by
suitable powers of ΛNP:
LNPeff =
1
Λ2NP
{
c1(e¯γµe)
2 + c2W
I
µνB
µνH†τIH + . . .
}
. (3)
At the leading order it is sufficient to consider only the operators of lowest
dimension, d = 6. The lower bound on ΛNP for each individual operator Oi,
neglecting the effects of all the others and normalizing |ci| = 1, ranges between
2 and 10 TeV. Turning several coefficients on at the same time does not quali-
tatively change the result, unless parameters are tuned [53]. The interpretation
of these results is that if new physics beyond the SM affects electroweak observ-
ables at the tree level, in which case ci ∼ O(1), then the generic lower bound
on its threshold ΛNP is a few TeV. The tension between this lower bound and
eq. (2) defines what is known as the ‘little’ hierarchy problem.
The little hierarchy problem is apparently mild. But its behaviour with
respect to fine tuning is problematic. If fine tuning of order ǫ is tolerated, then
the bound in eq. (2) is relaxed by a factor 1/
√
ǫ. The needed value of ǫ grows
quadratically with ΛNP, so that for ΛNP = 6 TeV one needs to tune to 1 part in
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a hundred in order to have mH = 200 GeV. The goal of this section is to make
a precise statement about the meaning of this fine-tuning problem.
3.2 Standard definition
The first modern meaning of naturalness is a reformulation of the hierarchy
problem. It arises from the fact that masses of scalar particles are not protected
against quantum corrections, and keeping a hierarchical separation between
the scale of EW symmetry breaking and the Planck scale requires the exis-
tence of a mechanism that would ‘naturally’ explain this hierarchy. Although
the difference in scales is a dimensionless parameter much smaller than unity
( 10
3GeV
1019GeV = 10
−16), setting it to zero in accordance with ’t Hooft’s prescrip-
tion is out of question because gravity exists even if it is weak∗. With all its
known problems, the Standard Model does not become more symmetric in the
hypothetical case where gravity is infinitely weaker than the weak interaction.
Therefore, ’t Hooft’s criterion does not apply and naturalness needs a new def-
inition.
According to Wilson [57], naturalness means that the observable properties
of a system should be stable against minute variations of the fundamental pa-
rameters. This 1978 formulation corresponds exactly to the lesson contained in
the hierarchy problem. It came at the end of a decade filled with debates on the
instability of the Higgs mass. In an article written at the end of 1970, Wilson
had clearly stated his doubt that the Higgs mechanism could be fundamental:
“It is interesting to note that there are no weakly coupled scalar particles in na-
ture; scalar particles are the only kind of free particles whose mass term does not
break either an internal or a gauge symmetry. . . .Mass or symmetry-breaking
terms must be ‘protected’ from large corrections at large momenta due to vari-
ous interactions (electromagnetic, weak, or strong). . . . This requirement means
that weak interactions cannot be mediated by scalar particles” [63]. After ten
years of such and similar doubts in the electroweak symmetry breaking through
the Higgs mechanism, the Standard Model was experimentally verified, and lit-
tle room remained for challenging its constitutive theoretical components. If
the hierarchy problem were to be tackled, the Standard Model now had to be
complemented rather than discarded.
In the years around 1980, supersymmetry advanced on the foreground as a
plausible extension of the problematic physics of electroweak symmetry break-
ing in the Standard Model. Consequently, naturalness began to be discussed
in the context of supersymmetric models with their enlarged content of parti-
cles and the new predicted phenomena, e.g., in a seminal paper by Witten [65].
As the number of proposed supersymmetric extensions of the Standard Model
increased, a formalization of naturalness was needed to evaluate their effective-
ness in solving the big hierarchy problem. The first such measure was defined
in mid-1980s as a quantitative analogue of Wilson’s formulation.
∗One exception from this argument are models with large extra dimensions, where the
scale of gravity is different from 1019 GeV [6].
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Barbieri and Giudice looked at various realizations of low-energy supersym-
metric phenomenology arising from supergravitational models [10, 34]. They
interpreted the notion of naturalness by equating it with the sensitivity of the
electroweak symmetry breaking scale (instantiated as the Z-boson mass mZ)
with respect to variations in model parameters. For a general observable O
depending on parameters pi at point P
′ this sensitivity is:
∆BG(O; pi) =
∣∣∣∣ piO(pi)
∂O(pi)
∂pi
∣∣∣∣ . (4)
Barbieri and Giudice then chose number 10 as a natural upper bound on ∆BG.
The motivation was their subjective belief that if the discrepancies between
quantities were to be natural, they must be less than of one order of magni-
tude. Yet, as such, the choice of a number is arbitrary. In a different context
(discussing naturalness in semantic chains), Lewis shows that the establishment
of an endpoint of perfect naturalness is connected with our own appreciation
of what is “not too complicated” [43, p. 61]. The opinion in such matters ap-
parently can evolve: ten years after the Barbieri-Giudice definition, when the
experimental constraints on the leading BSM candidate — minimal supersym-
metric standard model (MSSM) — became stronger, one had to require a fine
tuning of 20 for the model survival [23, 11]. Double the value of the old endpoint,
this new limit of naturalness also became accepted as “reasonable” [21].
Note that eq. (4) only involves infinitesimal variations in pi. It follows that
the Barbieri-Giudice definition gives a measure of naturalness of a given model
considered on its own, independently of the rival models which differ in the
values of parameters but also pretend to solve the big hierarchy problem. This
definition has been used widely and has helped to sort out the claims of differ-
ent supersymmetric models about how well they succeed in removing the big
hierarchy problem of the Standard Model. But it also failed to address a new
set of issues in the flourishing enterprise of model building.
3.3 Naturalness in supersymmetric models
In the late 1980s, BSM models began to be studied more thoroughly and a mul-
titude of their consequences became apparent, often unconnected with the big
hierarchy problem. Comparing this predicted phenomenology with the growing
ensemble of experimental data from particle accelerators required a new notion
of fine tuning. Now naturalness must have encompassed many observables (and
not just the Z mass). As a side effect of this evolution, the definitions of natu-
ralness no more considered only infinitesimal changes in parameters, but a finite
range of their values.
In spite of supersymmetry not being the only available solution of the big
hierarchy problem, a long line of studies have used fine tuning to make guesses
about the masses of sparticles. Early on, the MSSM parameter space was scru-
tinized, later leaving the place to that of NMSSM. In an article belonging to
this current, de Carlos and Casas [27], who were critically reviewing an earlier
work which used the Barbieri-Giudice measure [54], realized that a measure of
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sensitivity need not always be a measure of fine tuning. But they only concluded
that one should take 20 rather than 10 as a numerical limit of natural ∆BG.
More radically, a newly defined measure appeared in 1994, when Anderson
and Castan˜o refined the Barbieri-Giudice definition in order to exclude such
situations, i.e., when sensitivity is present in a model for other reasons than fine
tuning [3]. They divide the Barbieri-Giudice measure by its average value ∆¯
over some “sensible” range of parameters pi:
∆AC =
∆BG
∆¯BG
(5)
This range can be specified by fiat or can be chosen so as to encompass all
parameter values at which the model’s experimentally valid predictions remain
unperturbed. Naturalness then can be defined, in a slight modification of Wil-
son’s language, as a condition that observable properties of a system be “not
unusually unstable” against minute variations of the fundamental parameters.
The new word “unusual” implies comparison with the introduced range of pa-
rameters and has a first-order conceptual importance. Indeed, historically it
has brought the meaning of the fine-tuning argument in particle physics closer
to probabilistic estimates based on the anthropic reasoning.
That a range of parameters is involved in the definition of naturalness means
that parameter values in a particular model begin to be seen as just one instanti-
ation on the broader distribution of possible parameters. Anderson and Castan˜o
became the first to connect naturalness to the “likelihood” of a given set of La-
grangian parameters. They presupposed that there exist a way in which “we
parametrize our assumptions about the likelihood distribution of the theory’s
fundamental parameters” [4]. The range over which vary parameters pi then
arises as a mathematical representation of such assumptions. Anderson and
Castan˜o were so led to consider a class of identical models only differing in the
values of fundamental parameters, i.e., what we call today a landscape of sce-
narii defined by the values of pi. Distribution of parameters over their allowed
range was uniform and all values were considered equally likely.
If Anderson and Castan˜o were careful to speak about naturalness only as
likelihood of certain parameters, very soon did the word ‘probability’ enter the
stage. Introduced by Strumia and his co-authors, probability was not yet the
probability of a particular scenario seen on a landscape of many, but a mere
inverse of the Barbieri-Giudice measure of fine tuning. The latter was now
“supposed to measure, although in a rough way, the inverse probability of an
unnatural cancellation to occur” [11]:
P ∼ ∆−1BG. (6)
In a paper discussing naturalness of the MSSM, Ciafalano and Strumia speak
about probability as a “chance to obtain accidental cancellations” in MZ [25].
They attempt to demonstrate that the choice of a particular limiting value of
∆BG is no more then a choice of a “confidence limit on unprobable [sic] calcu-
lations”. This is how probability as a degree of confidence, i.e., in the Bayesian
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sense, made its way into particle physics. Strumia goes on to suggest that prob-
ability could be normalized by requiring that it be equal to 1 in the situations
where “we see nothing unnatural”. What this phrase means precisely is left
to our subjectivity. However, the normalization problem is very important: its
difficulty lies with the fact that most attempts to rigorously define parameter
space lead to non-normalizable solutions, so that it is impossible to define the
ratios between regions of these spaces [44]. Thus Strumia’s use of ‘probability’
is metaphoric. This probably was the reason why, previously, Anderson and
Castan˜o had avoided this term and had only spoken about ‘likelihood’.
The originally metaphoric phrase “roughly speaking, ∆−1BG measures the
probability of a cancellation” proved popular (see, e.g., [18]). It was used by
Giusti et al., when they variously spoke about “naturalness probability” or
“naturalness distribution probability” [38]. This line of thought refers to prob-
ability because it needs a justification for doing a Monte Carlo calculation of
“how frequently numerical accidents can make the Z boson sufficiently lighter
than the unobserved supersymmetric particles”. It is remarkable that, although
Bayesian in its roots (Monte Carlo being a Bayesian method), probability is seen
here as the frequency of an event occurring only in the thought experiments,
performed by an agent who imagines worlds with different values of the param-
eters of supersymmetry. This Gedankenfrequenz interpretation of probability
becomes typical for a group of papers on fine tuning in supersymmetric models.
Although frequentist in its formulation, it is a variant of the Bayesian point of
view because it relies on the subjective assignment of priors, which corresponds
to Anderson’s and Castan˜o’s “way in which we parametrize our assumptions”.
Initially the agent’s freedom to give a value to the prior probability is limited by
the boundaries of the allowed region of parameter space. Once in the allowed
region, stategies vary. On the one hand, Giusti et al. propose to choose values
randomly and use them in a calculation which leads to assigning a Bayesian
level of confidence to the sets of parameters. On the other hand, among many
articles using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) procedure for MSSM,
one finds other choices of priors, such as “naturalness-favouring prior” [2] or
“theoretical probability of a state of nature” [15].
Resulting in what they called ‘LHC forecasts’, these Bayesian studies make
“though reasonable, rather arbitrary” predictions about future experiments. It
is important that this approach has paved the way to understanding Strumia’s
metaphoric probability in the statistical sense. When ten years later Casas et
al. will be comparing definition (10) with definition (9), they will speak about
“the statistical meaning” of fine tuning [20].
3.4 Naturalness in model comparison
Defining naturalness with the help of a finite range of parameters corresponding
to different model-building scenarii became a dominant trend. Particle physics
was now seen as consisting of scenarii [7, 19, 20]. Naturalness was redefined in
this new language: it became a measure of “how atypical” are certain physical
scenarii [7]. If the use of fine tuning had previously been limited to emphasizing
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the problems of a particular model, many physicists state after the year 2000
that naturalness is used to compare models.
Anderson and Castan˜o modified the Barbieri-Giudice measure, eq. (5) in-
stead of eq. (4), because of the problem of global sensitivity. Athron and Miller
went further to consider models with several tuned observables as well as fi-
nite variations of parameters [7]. Parameters themselves are no more required
to be uniformly distributed over the considered range of parameter space. To
give a quantifiable version of this larger notion, Athron and Miller speak about
“generic” scenarii and “typical” volumes of parameter space formed by “similar”
scenarii. Introduced in the first modifications of the Barbieri-Giudice measure
as a finite range of parameters, exploration of the larger parameter space far
from the point P ′ reaches here its apogee.
To define ‘similar’ and ‘typical’, Athron and Miller claim in opposition to
Anderson and Castan˜o that the definitions must be “chosen to fit to the type
of problem one is considering”. They argue that a typical volume of parameter
space cannot be the Anderson-Castan˜o average of volumes G throughout the
whole parameter space, 〈G〉, for it would depend only on how far the parameters
are from some “hypothesized upper limits on their values”. For example, an
observable O which depends on a parameter p according to O = αp, will display
fine tuning for small values of p if one chooses the maximum possible value of p to
be large. In the Anderson-Castan˜o approach, upper limits on parameters arise
from the requirement that the model’s meaningful predictions be preserved. For
Athron and Miller this is too generic.
To fit the choice to particular cases, they introduce similar scenarii defined by
a “sensible” choice of how far numerically the observable value may deviate from
a given one. Let F be the volume of dimensionless variations in the parameters
over some arbitrary range [a, b] around point P ′ and G be the volume in which
dimensionless variations of the observable fall into the same range:
a ≤ pi (P )
pi (P ′)
≤ b, a ≤ Oj ({pi (P )})
Oj ({pi (P ′)}) ≤ b. (7)
In their MSSM calculation Athron and Miller use a = b = 0.1 claiming that this
10% threshold amounts to not encountering a “dramatically different” physics.
The measure of fine tuning then is
∆AM =
F
G
. (8)
This measure can be applied straightforwardly in the case of a single ob-
servable like the Z mass, but it can also be applied to compare the tuning
between different observables. In the latter case F and G are volumes in the
multi-dimensional spaces of, respectively, parameters and observables. The for-
mer space is not new, for the notion of naturalness defined by many parameters
dates back to Barbieri and Giudice:
∆ = max
i
{∆BG(pi)}. (9)
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Alternative variants have also been proposed, such as [17, 19]
∆ =
√∑
i
∆BG (pi). (10)
On the contrary, introducing a multi-dimensional space of observables is a nov-
elty.
With the development of model building it became clear that the big hier-
archy problem was not the only fine tuning to be found. Many experimental
parameters were measured constraining the values of parameters in BSM mod-
els, such as quark masses, the strong coupling constant, the anomalous magnetic
moment of the muon, the relic density of thermal dark matter, smallness of flavor
violation, non-observation of sparticles below certain thresholds and so forth.
Fine tunings produced by these measurements are “morally similar” [55] to the
fine tuning frommZ . A variety of heuristics are then possible. One can consider
the most constraining fine tuning or some form of the average of many tunings.
Motivations from different tunings may not be equally “compelling” and less
remarkable parameters may be therefore discarded.
Still the Anderson-Castan˜o problem of upper limits on p cannot be avoided
even if one defines similar scenarii independently. Athron and Miller wish to
maintain decorrelated tunings and to vary each observable without regard for
others. Individual contributions to volume G are then made with no concern for
contributions from other observables. At this point Athron and Miller realize
that observables can only be compared if ∆AM is normalized. To do so, they
are forced to reintroduce the Anderson-Castan˜o average value (5):
∆ˆAM =
1
∆¯
F
G
, (11)
which relies on the knowledge of the total allowed range of parameters in a
particular model. The hypothesized upper limit of this range determines how
compelling the naturalness argument for new physics will be. The same normal-
ization procedure is essential if one wants to use fine tuning to compare different
models.
Although it appears in the literature as an incremental refinement of the
original Wilson’s idea through the work of Barbieri, Giudice, Anderson, Castan˜o
and others, the Athron-Miller notion of naturalness lies very far from Wilson’s.
Naturalness has become a statistical measure of how atypical is a particular
scenario. It is now tempting to use the numerical value of fine tuning to set off
several scenarii against each other: the least tuned scenario is to be preferred,
where ‘preferred’ is understood in a practical, heuristic sense of model building.
In practice, not only similar (in the Athron-Miller sense) scenarii are compared
according to the value of their fine tuning, but models predicting completely
different physics are sometimes brought into a competition against each other
on the basis of their naturalness. On the one hand, one reads that:
The focus point region of mSUGRA model is especially compelling
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in that heavy scalar masses can co-exist with low fine-tuning. . . [8,
our emphasis]
We . . . find preferable ratios which reduce the degree of fine tun-
ing. [1, our emphasis]
On the other hand, such claims are mixed with assertions going beyond the
applicability of the Anderson-Castan˜o or even the Athron-Miller definitions:
Some existing models. . . are not elevated to the position of supersym-
metric standard models by the community. That may be because
they involve fine-tunings. . . [14, our emphasis]
In order to be competitive with supersymmetry, Little Higgs models
should not worsen the MSSM performance [in terms of the degree
of fine tuning]. Fine tuning much higher than the one associated to
the Little Hierarchy problem of the SM . . . or than that of super-
symmetric models . . . is a serious drawback. [19, our emphasis]
. . . the fine-tuning price of LEP. . . [23, 11, our emphasis]
Comparing altogether different models by confronting the numbers, e.g., being
tuned at 1% against being tuned at 10%, is meaningless unless one of two
conditions is met: either the two models can be put in the common parameter
space and the Athron-Miller definition is to be used, or conclusions drawn from
such comparison are employed in a particular way. Because they cannot be
said to bear on truth value of the models, they can be understood as shaping
the historic and sociological competition between otherwise uncommensurable
models.
4 Ontological interpretation
4.1 The anthropic connection
The naturalness problem was one of the factors that gave rise to theories beyond
the Standard Model. Since the 1970s, the SM began to be viewed as an approx-
imation to some future fundamental theory, i.e., an effective field theory (EFT)
valid up to some limit ΛNP . The fundamental theory may involve gravity, and
the SM would then become its low-energy limit. The EFT approach relies cru-
cially on the assumption of decoupling between energy scales and the possibility
to encode such a decoupling in a few modified constants of the field-theoretic
perturbation series. This connects EFT with naturalness.
Understood as a hierarchy problem, naturalness is the measure of stability
against higher-order corrections in the perturbation series. If the higher-order
corrections were important, it would invalidate the use of the perturbation ex-
pansion and, together with it, the EFT method. “If the experiments at the
LHC find no new phenomena linked to the TeV scale, the naturalness criterion
would fail and the explanation of the hierarchy between electroweak and gravi-
tational scales would be beyond the reach of effective field theories. But if new
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particles at the TeV scale are indeed discovered, it will be a triumph for our
understanding of physics in terms of symmetries and effective field theories” [36].
If low-energy models (e.g., MSSM) are EFTs with respect to some unified
theory involving gravitation (e.g., supersymmetric models of gravity), it is possi-
ble to speak within one and the same theory about the fine tuning of low-energy
observables (like mZ) as well as about the fine tuning of the cosmological con-
stant. Thus fine tuning in particle physics and fine tuning is cosmology become
connected. While the latter tuning has a long tradition of been interpreted an-
thropically, it is through this connection that the former tuning acquires a tint
of anthropic meaning.
Introduction of the range of parameter values in the definitions of natural-
ness, eqs. (5), (8), and (11), pushes one in the direction of the many-worlds on-
tology. If every value from the range of parameters is realized in some world, one
can justify the fine tuning argument as a probability distribution corresponding
to our chances to find ourselves in one of these ontologically real worlds. This
interpretation seems totally fictitious, but it is the one shared intuitively by
many physicists, particularly string theorists and cosmologists [16]. It inserts
the fine-tuning argument in a larger class of anthropic arguments based on the
many-worlds reasoning.
The argument goes as follows. 1◦, establish that the descriptions of worlds
with different values of parameters are mathematically consistent and not pre-
cluded by the theory. 2◦, establish that such worlds really exist. For this,
refer to Gell-Mann’s “totalitarian principle”, requiring that anything which is
not prohibited be compulsory [13]. Alternatively, refer to what Dirac called
“Eddington’s principle of identification”, that is, asserting the realist interpre-
tation of mathematical quantities as physical entities [28]. Or extrapolate to
all physics Peierls’s position that “in quantum electrodynamics one has always
succeeded with the principle that the effects, for which one does not obtain
diverging results, also correspond to reality” [48]. 3◦, establish that among all
possible worlds those containing highly fine-tuned models are statistically rare,
for their probability is defined by the inverse fine tuning. Indeed, the defini-
tion of “unnatural” was so chosen that, compared to the full number of worlds,
the proportion of unnatural worlds is necessarily tiny. 4◦, conclude that if we
evaluate our chances to be in such a world, the resulting probability must be
low.
This argument can, and has been, criticized at every step from 1 to 4. For
example, depending on the concrete variety of the anthropic argument, the
pronoun ‘we’ (step 4) refers either to intelligent beings, or worlds with carbon-
based life, or else worlds with complex chemical elements and so forth. Logically,
everything happens as if there were a choice-making meta-agent with access
to reason. But with an ontological interpretation of worlds, this meta-agent
becomes a super-agent with a power of action extending over the many worlds,
who blindly decides to put us in a world of her choice. The existence of such
super-agent is of course metaphysical. Yet it warrants the posture that, provided
our task to predict in which world we shall end up, we cannot fare better than
guess it probabilistically, by taking the inverse of the fine tuning measure ∆.
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The specific problem of the anthropic argument in particle physics, empha-
sized in Section 3, is that the ‘full number of worlds’ (step 3) can be only defined
arbitrarily. Upper limits of the range of parameter values have to be set by fiat.
If one goes in this too far, it would preclude some worlds from existing without
a contradiction with theory or data, thus violating the requirement at step 1.
But how far one can go in parameter variations and keep the premises of step 1
intact is not obvious. At the first sight, this difficulty may seem unremarkable
and the anthropic argument would seem a valid implication. Inconspicuity of
the limit problem, which is often left unmentioned, is similar to the general
disregard among physicists of the frequent use of ‘probability’ in a metaphoric,
formally indefensible sense. Yet if the story of naturalness in particle physics
teaches a clear lesson about anthropic reasoning, it is about how to show its
arbitrariness on a concrete example.
4.2 Counterfactuals
The fine-tuning argument shares with a larger class of anthropic arguments a
twofold logical nature: these arguments can either be formulated in purely in-
dicative terms or by using counterfactuals. The first kind of formulations, using
only indicative terms, are typically employed by opponents of the anthropic
principle [56]. They mean to dissolve the apparent explanatory power of the
argument by rewording it in terms of facts and of the laws of inference in classic
Boolean logic. Devoid of the counterfactual, the anthropic argument indeed
becomes trivial.
The second kind of logic involving explicit counterfactuals is more common.
Anthropic arguments take the form of statements such as ‘If parameters were
different then intelligent life would not have existed”; or ‘If parameters were
different then complex chemistry would not have existed’; or ‘If parameters
were different then carbon-based life would not be possible’. The principal
question is to find out whether such statements are explanatory, and if yes,
then in what sense. Answers to it typically involve a detailed analysis of the
counterfactual semantics. We only note here that there exists a physical, but
no less fundamental than any logical, problem of validity and applicability of a
counterfactually formulated argument.
Counterfactuals in physics have been discussed at least since the Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen paper about quantum mechanics in 1935 [33]. The key
point in the EPR argument is in the wording: “If. . . we had chosen another
quantity. . . we should have obtained. . . ”. The Kochen-Specker theorem and
Specker’s discussion of counterfactuals in 1960 placing them in the context of
medieval scholastic philosophy were the starting point of a heated debate on
the use of counterfactuals in quantum mechanics (for recent reviews see [60,
58]). Peres formulated perhaps clearest statements about the post-Bell-theorem
status of counterfactuals:
The discussion involves a comparison of the results of experiments
which were actually performed, with those of hypothetical experi-
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ments which could have been performed but were not. It is shown
that it is impossible to imagine the latter results in a way compat-
ible with (a) the results of the actually performed experiments, (b)
long-range separability of results of individual measurements, and
(c) quantum mechanics. . . .
There are two possible attitudes in the face of these results. One is
to say that it is illegitimate to speculate about unperformed exper-
iments. In brief “Thou shalt not think.” Physics is then free from
many epistemological difficulties.. . . Alternatively, for those who can-
not refrain from thinking, we can abandon the assumption that the
results of measurements by A are independent of what is being done
by B. . . . Bell’s theorem tells us that such a separation is impossible
for individual experiments, although it still holds for averages. [49]
The debate in quantum mechanics shows that the applicability of Boolean
logic to statements about physical observables should not taken for granted in
any branch of physics, especially those based on quantum mechanics. Quantum
field theory is one. Simply, its focus has stayed with technical feats for so long
that conceptual issues about measurement, inherited from quantum mechanics,
have been neglected. The tendency has prevailed to assign values to unobserved
parameters in experimental settings which cannot be realized in principle, e.g.
in the case of Gedankenfrequenz.
Admittedly, even if the counterfactual in the fine-tuning argument in particle
physics bears on physical parameters in the worlds impossible to observe, this
does not lead to a direct contradiction with quantum mechanical theorems, for
quantum mechanics deals with normalized probability spaces and Hermitian
observables. It nonetheless remains true that the logic of anthropic arguments
runs counter to the trend warranted by the lessons from quantum mechanics.
Speculation about unperformed experiments is illegitimate not only in the case
of unrealized measurements of Hermitian operators, but in a more general sense:
it is unsound to extend to unperformed experiments in unrealized worlds the
Boolean logical structure allowing us to say that physical constants in those
worlds have definite values.
This line of critique resonates with Bohr’s answer to Professor Høffding when
the latter asked him and Heisenberg during a discussion at the University of
Copenhagen: “Where can the electron be said to be in its travel from the point
of entry to the point of detection?” Bohr replied: ”To be? What does it mean
to be?” [62, p. 18-19] The fine-tuning argument in particle physics, as well as
anthropic arguments involving the cosmological constant, employ counterfactu-
als that contain the verb ‘to be’ in the conditional. What it means that a world
which is referred to in this conditional, had been, was or is, would have been
unclear for Bohr. He was greatly concerned with the meaning of utterances,
famously claiming that “physics is what we can say about physics” [62, p. 16].
In the case of fine tuning this claim may be understood as a radical warning to
all those who interpret fine tuning ontologically.
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5 Probabilistic falsification
5.1 Interpretation of probability
Casas et al. consider two tunings of two different observables and propose that
“since ∆ and ∆(λ) represent independent inverse probabilities, they should be
multiplied to estimate the total fine tuning ∆ · ∆(λ) in the model” [19]. This
is clear evidence of the statistical meaning of naturalness, shared by many par-
ticle physicists since the work of Ciafaloni and Strumia [25]. We argued in
Section 3.3 that the notion of probability must be interpreted here in a pe-
culiar way combining a frequentist approach with Bayesianism. Frequency is
Gedankenfrequenz, because one counts the number of particular occurrences in
the class of imaginary untestable numerical scenarios, instantiated as points in
the parameter space. The Bayesian component arises in the form of degree of
confidence, for one is concerned with our current ignorance of the true value of
a parameter, which we believe to be measured in the future. When a param-
eter has already been measured, even outspoken proponents of the statistical
meaning of naturalness admit that “assigning to it a probability can be mislead-
ing” [19]. Therefore, the fine-tuning argument is to be understood as a bet on
our future state of knowledge, and it loses all meaning at the moment of actual
measurement. Hic et nunc the future state of knowledge does not exist, and the
bet is subjective. However, in our mind it does exist, and in this mental reality
naturalness can be interpreted as frequency.
Two conditions must be met for one to have the ability, by way of natu-
ralness, of making bets on future physics. First, experimental data must lack
dramatically, so that uncertainty be complete as for which model better de-
scribes reality. This is indeed the case in particle physics. Second, we must hold
a belief that in the future, hopefully soon enough, this veil of uncertainty will
be lifted. Moreover, we ought to take it for granted that the lifting of the veil
will unambiguously determine which of our current models is right and which is
wrong. Subjective bets make sense only if the future state is a choice between
the available alternatives. Physicists using the fine tuning argument hold such
a belief indeed. If they refer to naturalness, they assume full confidence that
the true description of reality will be picked out of the current models, once and
for all, at the LHC or later experiments.
As in the general case of probabilistic reasoning in a situation of uncertainty
(see, e.g., [45]), the fine tuning argument is the last resort when no scientific
explanation can be provided. Psychologically, it is very difficult to resist the
temptation to make a “statistical guess” [19] at the future state of knowledge.
Although naturalness provides guidance but adds nothing to scientific truth,
accepting its irrelevance and “living with the existence of fine tuning” [30] is a
hard way of life. This temptation though is not completely unfamiliar as we
already live in a world with many fine tunings, for example:
• The apparent angular size of the Moon is the same as the an-
gular size of the Sun within 2.5%.
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• The recount of the US presidential election results in Florida in
2000 had the official result of 2913321 Republican vs. 2913144
Democratic votes, with the ratio equal to 1.000061, i.e., fine-
tuned to one with the precision of 0.006%.
• The ratio of 987654321 to 123456789 is equal to 8.000000073,
i.e., eight with the precision of 10−8. In this case, unlike in
the previous two which are coincidences, there is a ‘hidden’
principle in number theory, responsible for the large amount of
fine tuning. [42]
By the analogy with the last example, if we believe that a ‘hidden’ new prin-
ciple in particle physics will be uncovered (and we believe it if we place bets on
the future state of knowledge), running a competition between models by com-
paring their amount of fine tuning may seem to bring us closer to uncovering
the principle. However, to adhere to this idea would be logically and method-
ologically incorrect, for the principles of Nature, both known and unknown, are
unique — i.e., unstatistical — and independent of our will. Then, naturalness
can only serve to satisfy a human psychological urge. We use it to please the
senses by setting off the models in a beauty contest. Such a disappointing ver-
dict for naturalness would indeed sound grim and gloomy, had it not been for
its different, and a less nebulous, function.
5.2 Naturalness as heuristics
Karl Popper’s falsification, which took much inspiration from the pretense to
adequately describe the methodology of high-energy physics, relies on the as-
sumption that physical experiment can rule out definitively certain predictions
made within theoretical models. If this is the case, then the models, or at least
such elements of these models that are directly responsible for the unfulfilled
predictions, do not describe physical reality, and are false.
Popperian methodology depends critically on the possibility to interpret ex-
perimental data. If the findings are not conclusive, models cannot be falsified
in the original sense of Popper’s. Yet in particle physics of the last 25 years
experimental findings have not been conclusive. While the power of particle
accelerators grows and their exploratory capacity continues to be gradually aug-
mented, no recent accelerator experiment has falsified a theoretical model, even
if, in accordance with the falsification doctrine, the predicted phenomena had
not been observed. This is chiefly because experiments at particle accelerators,
as well as the gathered cosmological data, are so complex that one is unable
to set up a unique correspondence between data and predictions made within
theoretical models. We often ignore if we already possess a name or a theory
for what we have observed. Unambiguous falsification of the models in particle
physics is therefore impossible. At best, experimental findings suggest that cer-
tain predictions, while not completely ruled out, are rather difficult to sustain
as open possibilities.
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Departing from the original Popper’s view, methodology of particle physics
mutates thus into its probabilistic version. Complex experiments at the accel-
erators leave any model with a chance to die and a chance to survive, but never
act as definitive model murderers. Notwithstanding, a model can still die: not
because it was falsified, but merely for falling out of fashion.
The rise and fall of theories and models in contemporary particle physics is
more a matter of a partly circumstantial history than subject to a rigorous epis-
temology. Influence of the sociological factors can be decisive, e.g., the choice
at the leading universities of professors with a particular taste in physics, or
the abrupt reversals between fashionable and worn-out lines of research. The
argument from naturalness is a powerful instrument for influencing the develop-
ment of particle physics, for, in virtue of having the form of a normal scientific
argument, it can speak to the scientist. Indeed, arbitrariness of the measure of
naturalness used for comparing different models is disguised. On the surface,
one only encounters a presumably legitimate comparison of numbers, which does
not bear any sign of the underlying problematic choice of the limiting range of
parameters in the parameter space.
Those who are the first to fix the arbitrary convention of what is natural
and what is not, exercise significant influence over those who will follow later.
Wilson, Barbieri and Giudice did so. In particular, Barbieri and Giudice gave
a mathematical definition of fine tuning, providing a definite form to what had
only been a vague feeling of aesthetical unease. Ever since the 1990s, their
work has been turned, albeit usually in the hands of others, into a powerful
sociological instrument.
Imagine two models which theoretically explain away the big hierarchy prob-
lem, meanwhile no experimental measurements can be made to distinguish be-
tween them. The only possible competition between the models is based on
purely mathematical criteria such as the numerical value of fine tuning. To
know which model will win in the course of history, provided that experimental-
ists are unable to settle this question, one can only make guesses. And to make
a plausible bet in this uncertain future-oriented competition, it may be helpful
to use the heuristics of naturalness.
Now imagine that in the future the current argument from naturalness is
sociologically overrun by something else. No matter what the modification will
be, it is only likely that the argument accepted by the scientific community
will mutate into another argument accepted by the scientific community. That
fine tuning would be altogether proclaimed irrelevant or invalid, can hardly be
envisaged. Influence of the naturalness heuristic initiated in the 1980s cannot
be erased. Indeed, one such modification happened around 2000, when, without
having previously been a scientific argument for model comparison, the argu-
ment from naturalness grew into presenting itself as such, and at the same time
continuity was forcefully proclaimed with the original notion.
Trends in the model building in particle physics were formed by the natural-
ness-based heuristics, which is instrumental in dismissing “unnatural” theories
and could yet lead to a “more complete model” explaining stability of the weak
scale [3]. Physicists sometimes see clearly this mutation of the fine-tuning heuris-
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tics. For example, Bine´truy et al. warn that
The [fine-tuning] approach should be treated as providing guidance
and should not be used for conclusions such as “the heterotic string
theory on an orbifold is 3.2σ better at fitting data than a Type I
theory...” [14]
But even if such warnings are heard, and the direct judgment of the kind “one
model is better than another” avoided, the sociological heuristics is still at work.
One its manifestation is that working physicists will turn away from highly tuned
models because their faith in them has been lost. This is connected with the
Bayesian meaning of naturalness as “degree of confidence”.
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Figure 2: Schematic graph of fine tuning versus model complexity in the space
of models beyond SM [24].
Another manifestation is that the heuristics of naturalness has so influenced
model building that no simple model without significant fine tuning remains in
the valid model space (Figure 2). Unnaturalness of simpler models led to the
development of more complicated ones, which are allegedly less tuned. Even
if at the end of the day such more complex models often turn out to be as
tuned as simpler ones (e.g., see [55]), the sociological and historic influence due
to the naturalness heuristics will have occurred before any such result can be
established.
Research direction in particle physics moved away from the considerations of
simplicity. This was hardly imaginable even a short while ago, when, e.g., Quine
wrote that “simplicity, economy and naturalness. . . contribute to the molding of
scientific theories generally” [52]. Quine’s conventionalist view is intimately
linked with the thesis of empirical underdetermination of natural science by
observable events. It holds that the acceptance of a theory is a matter of choice
guided by extra-scientific criteria, of which simplicity is one [51, 12].
Contrary to Quine, naturalness and simplicity are frequent rivals and pull
physics in different directions. Dirac believed that in this case beauty has prece-
dence over simplicity:
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The research worker, in his efforts to express the laws of Nature in
mathematical form, should strive mainly for mathematical beauty.
He should still take simplicity into consideration in a subordinate
way to beauty.. . . It often happens that the requirements of simplicity
and beauty are the same, but when they clash the latter must take
precedence [29].
Clashes happen more often these days, and the lack of simplicity can become
dramatic. Complexity of some BSM models makes them less comprehensible,
more difficult for doing calculations, and brings them closer to the status of a
theory that we only believe, but do not know, to exist. Yet the beauty and ele-
gance of simpler and easier to grasp models is accompanied by their low inverse
fine-tuning probability. How will the rivalry between simplicity and natural-
ness end? Many a human researcher find it repulsive enough to look for less
tuned, but also more complex theories which are harder to describe. Perhaps the
difficulty of working with such models and extracting from them unambiguous
predictions suggests a rapid end of the naturalness-based heuristic, as physicists
will seek for dramatically different, but in a new way simpler solutions.
To this day, naturalness as heuristics has mainly served to support the claim
for the inadequacy of the original Popper’s falsificationism. If we are now con-
cerned with the role of metaphysical and aesthetic arguments in science, in the
future the greater influence of simplicity may yet prevail on the heuristics of
naturalness. The latter would then be reduced to the purely circumstantial de-
sire of certain scientists for a self-justification of their continuing work on the
semi-dead physical models.
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